Global AI Assurance · Layer 07
AI Incident Intelligence
Most AI incident records say the model failed. That is not a record an institution can learn from, report against or defend. An AI incident is a control event with an actor, a reach, a regulation and an aftermath, and it needs to be captured that way from the first minute.
The incident record
Institution and entity
Which legal entity carries the obligation that was engaged.
Model
Provider, family and hosting arrangement at the time of the event.
Agent
The acting identity, so the authority envelope can be tested against what happened.
Version
Behaviour is version-specific. Without it, the incident is not reproducible.
Environment
Production, pilot or evaluation. It changes the reporting obligation.
Tool
The interface through which the action reached an institutional system.
Data
Classes touched, and whether a transfer or a disclosure obligation followed.
Action
What the system actually did, separate from what it output.
Control that failed
Named control, so effectiveness monitoring can be corrected.
Regulation engaged
The obligation and the authority, with the reporting clock that started.
Impact
Client, market, financial and service impact, measured not asserted.
Containment
What stopped it, who authorised that, and how long it took.
What changed after
The control, envelope or test that was altered as a result.
The same record satisfies an internal post-incident review, a third-line audit request and a supervisory notification, because it was never written for only one of them.
Early warning
Read across the estate rather than incident by incident, and the signal usually arrives before the loss does.
Repeat refusals at one boundary
An envelope is mis-scoped or a business process is routing around a control.
Drift clustering on one model version
A provider change is propagating across every agent on that version.
Tool-server failures across owners
A shared dependency, not a local fault. Treat as concentration.
Rising human-review volume
Evaluation confidence is falling before any incident is recorded.
Evidence freshness decaying
The control may still operate, but it can no longer be proven.
Incidents and dependencies read together produce a systemic view rather than a queue of unrelated events.
AI Systemic Risk